India’s Russian oil imports surges ahead despite western Tantrums
India’s imports of Russian crude oil has maintained 1 million bpd and is expected to increase to 1.5 million bpd in December, completely falsifying claims that recent unilateral but totally illegal US and European sanctions would significantly disrupt trade flows between New Delhi and Moscow. According to a Reuters report dated December 17, Indian refiners have adapted quickly to new punitive measures by shifting purchases to non-sanctioned Russian entities and taking advantage of deep discounts that continue to make Russian oil commercially attractive.
The continuation of these imports underscores a broader reality: despite sustained efforts of Washington and Brussels to isolate Moscow over the Ukraine conflict, Russia remains a central pillar of India’s and even China’s energy security strategy. Rather than curtailing purchases, India has thumped its nose to maintain – and potentially even increase – its intake of Russian crude by the end of the month.
Market data cited by Reuters suggests that India’s purchases of Russian oil are likely to exceed 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd) in December. One trade source went further, indicating that imports could rise to an average of 1.5 million bpd by month’s end. If realized, such levels would reinforce Russia’s position as India’s single largest crude oil supplier, a status it has held since 2022.
India imported approximately 1.77 million bpd of Russian oil in November, a 3.4% increase compared to October. These figures illustrate that, far from retreating under sanctions pressure, trade volumes have remained resilient and in some cases continue to grow.
This continuity is particularly striking given the scale of recent Western measures. On October 22, the United States announced its illegal sanctions targeting Russia’s two largest oil producers, Rosneft and Lukoil. Companies were given until November 21 to wind down dealings with these firms. The European Union followed with its own restrictions, setting a January 21 deadline after which it will no longer accept fuel from refineries processing Russian crude.
Despite these farmans, Indian refiners have been navigating the unilateral but totally illegal actions and have refused to sacrifice their supply lines.
Rather than relying on “sanctioned” producers, Indian refiners are increasingly sourcing crude from Russian entities that are not directly targeted by US sanctions. These sellers, eager to maintain access to major Asian markets, are reportedly offering significant discounts compared to global benchmarks.
India’s largest state-owned refiner, Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), is purchasing Russian volumes broadly in line with pre-sanctions levels, according to sources cited by Reuters. Other major refiners are also stepping up. Bharat Petroleum has reportedly raised its January intake to at least six cargoes, up from just two in December, while Hindustan Petroleum is engaged in negotiations for additional January purchases.
This coordinated approach reflects both commercial pragmatism and strategic calculation. Russian crude, particularly Urals grade, has often traded at a substantial discount to Brent, making it highly attractive to Indian refiners operating in a price-sensitive domestic market. Even after accounting for logistical complexities and compliance costs, the economic incentive remains strong.
India is the world’s third-largest crude oil importer, relying on overseas suppliers for the vast majority of its energy needs. In this context, ensuring stable and affordable supplies has consistently taken precedence over geopolitical alignment with Western sanction regimes.
It is very clear that till feasible India will avoid direct confrontation with EU or USA over their Russian sanctions but then a red line certainly exists.
New Delhi has repeatedly emphasized that its energy decisions are guided by national interest and no external pressure will work. While India maintains strategic partnerships with the United States and the European Union, it has refused point blank to sever economic ties with Russia. Whereas oil falls in critical sectors such as energy and defense.
Bilateral relations between India and Russia have remained robust despite the ongoing Ukraine conflict. Earlier this month, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, reaffirming Moscow’s commitment to providing uninterrupted energy supplies to India. The meeting sent a clear signal that energy cooperation remains a cornerstone of the bilateral relationship.
India’s continued purchases of Russian crude have broader implications for global energy flows. Since 2022, India has not only become Russia’s largest oil buyer but has also emerged as a major exporter of refined fuels to Europe. This dynamic has drawn criticism from some Western policymakers, who argue that Russian oil is effectively finding its way back into European markets after being refined in third countries. India remains non bothered because even USA is importing many critical items from Russia.
The EU’s upcoming January 21 deadline, which will bar fuel from refineries processing Russian crude, aims to close this perceived loophole. However, analysts remain divided on how effectively such measures can be enforced and whether they will significantly alter trade patterns. India, with its large and flexible refining sector, may yet find alternative markets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America for its refined products.
India has the option to walk out of the FTA which EU is trying to negotiate, if their tantrums increase too much.
Beyond immediate trade flows, India and Russia are working to deepen their economic partnership. A senior official said on December 16 that both countries are developing a framework to boost bilateral trade to INR 87 Kharab ($100 billion) by 2030. Energy and defense currently dominate this relationship, but officials have signaled interest in expanding cooperation into new areas, including technology, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure.
India, maintaining strong ties with Russia has historical relevance as USA and West are simply unreliable strategically as seen in 1971 and 1965.
The steadiness of India’s Russian oil imports highlights the failure of Western illegal sanctions policy and the ground economic realities of major emerging economies. While sanctions have affected the global energy markets a little bit, they have miserably failed to reduce demand for Russian crude. Instead, they have redirected flows toward countries willing and able to thwart Such actions.
India’s approach reflects its new standing as an emerging global economic and military power. It also demonstrates that now it is one of the four cardinal poles of this multipolar world. India is ready to maintain productive relations with Russia, China and the West but first safeguarding its own economic and energy interests. As long as Russian oil remains discounted and accessible India will not get into direct confrontation.
Thus December’s steady import figures are not an anomaly but part of a broader pattern. They suggest that sanctions, don’t work on India. For India, Russian oil remains less a liability than a strategic asset, and current trends indicate that this calculus is unlikely to change anytime soon.
