One of the turning points of the Kargil War
By Lt Gen (Dr) K Himalay Singh, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, YSM, Retd
25 years ago, I had the unique honour of commanding my paltan during the Kargil war as part of 3 Infantry Division in the Chalunka/Turtuk sector to the north of the Shyok river valley. Most of the actions during the war in the area North of Khardungla Pass during the war remain unknown to the “fouji ‘ fraternity till date, leave alone the civilians.
Spectacular battles fought by our soldiers in the areas such as point 5810 in Ladakh Range and point 5770 near NJ 9842 deserve mention among others in this sector. In fact, the capture of point 5770 by my Paltan has been cited as one of the three turning points in the war by a research team of Naval War College, USA in 2002. No less a person then the Ex COAS during the war, General VP Malik in his tweet had mentioned about my unit and those braves who deserved to have been accorded far greater recognition than they had otherwise been.
In his book” From Surprise to Victory’ Gen VP Malik mentioned about the capture of Point 5770” was one of the toughest and most audacious operations, at par with the capture of Bana Top in 1987 in the Northern Glacier”. Gen Malik personally conveyed these sentiments to me during one of his visits to Mhow sometime in 2016. Coming from the wartime Chief to a CO of the unit involved in the said battle meant a lot for me.
Few details are available of this operation by my unit due to ignorance of people who wrote the After Action Reports / history in higher HQs. Harping into the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of this lapse of recognition to the braves at that time will serve no purpose and I consider it as unsoldierly to do so now, even as the lessons of such battles need to be shared for greater good of our army.
Point 5770 ( Enemy Balal Post) lies in the proximity of NJ 9842 which defines the point on the map up to which the Line of Control was delineated after the Shimla Agreement in 1972.
From here on the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) commences along the Siachen group of glaciers up to the Karakoram Pass. This 19000 feet high massive feature dominates a large chunk of the Southern Glaciers and area opposite in the POK.
The approach to the feature was interspersed with dangerous glaciers, crevasses, ice overhangs, ice gullies and vertical rock faces. It is believed that the Pakistani efforts to occupy this position had been in progress from late 1998 alongside the planned intrusion through multiple points all along the LOC north of Zojila Pass as part of OP BADR.
The Pakistani military aim was clearly to block Srinagar-Leh highway, threatening the major lifeline to our deployments in Siachen and eastern Ladakh.
The Pakistani operation unfolded on the ground during early 1999 even as thorough planning and limited occupation of critical points may have commenced sometime in late 1998 itself.
Indications of their activities were also detected in the un held gaps along the LOC between ChorbatLa and the Turtuk Sector during the period. Point 5770 was part of their occupation plan by using Northern Light infantry troops.
Multiple intelligence inputs trickled down as merely information to units without much analysis during the entire period. Inputs about logistics build up by the enemy opposite, increased shelling across the LOC and AGPL sectors were indicators for challenging times of 1998-99.
Blissfully unaware of rapid changes in operational scenario, I along with a large contingent of my unit were flagged off on 03 May from Leh for a cross country adventure trek across the Ladakh Range through a pass called DigarLa and rafting down the mighty Shyok River thereafter.
This was the level of our appreciation of the situation based on intelligence inputs of that time. On official commencement of OP VIJAY on 06 May, my unit was given the tasks to relieve the unit in Southern glacier, patrol the unheld gaps in the Ladakh Range and to be prepared to occupy Point 5770 at the earliest.
We got down to business at double time. Physical reconnaissance of the intended objective by me and my team revealed that the feature had been under enemy occupation for quite some time.
It was estimated that the objective could be held by about platoon less a section strength with well- coordinated fire support. The gradient on the enemy side of the feature was relatively gradual.
Our plan for capture of the objective were shared with the higher HQ. The plan entailed a daylight silent assault taking a route along the most difficult approach by fixing ropes stealthily and reach as near as possible to the objective.
Small teams for the actual assault were divided in two echelons and larger teams detailed for the Reorganisation stage, while fire support were to be provided from flanks from existing locations by weapons in range.
Artillery guns were to be kept on standby, Higher HQ sent Captain Shyamal Sinha (KUMAON) and two others from HAWS and four boys from the Ladakh scouts for assisting the unit in the rope fixing operations in particular.
It was a huge calculated risk in that I took the decision for a day assault by a platoon divided into two small teams in each rope in the first echelon to be followed by a quick 2nd echelon of another platoon led by a JCO. The formal teachings recommended at least 3 to 1 numerical superiority in the plains and 6 to 1 in mountains. It was planned for Major NS Cheema and Captain Sinha to lead one team each in 1st echelon with Cheema as the assault commander. Doing away with artillery preparatory bombardment was another very risky decision I had to take to maintain surprise. In location Company Commander, Major D S Saini was made responsible to coordinate all the fire support.
I had chosen my command posts near a huge rocky point nearly 650 meters from the objective from where I could observe the enemy as well as my troops during their approach to the objective. I was to remain in line communication with both Cheema and Sinha. The assaulting troops were in no position to see the route clearly. The selected route was concealed from the enemy due to its gradient of nearly 85 degrees. In sum, rifle company plus a platoon were involved in the operations including the 2nd echelon, Reorg party and the Fire support party.
The first attempt to capture the objective was planned for 25 June 99. The team commenced their approach at about 2.30 am and reached about 150-200M short of the objective around 1 pm when a strong blizzard engulfed the area with total white out conditions. It was not possible for me to telephonically guide the troops to the objective nor was it possible for them to see the route to the objective then. I called off the operations that day and ordered the assault troops to fall back. Luckily for us the enemy didn’t seem to have any idea of our movements that day. We had to figure out the next possible attempt for the operations. 27 June 99 was Tuesday, a revered day for our troops being “ Lord Hanuman,s Day”. It was also the lucky number of my unit ie 27 RAJPUT! A positive feeling came over all of us. We made the decision to resume the operations on 27 June 99. The morning was calm. Our assault troops had already commenced their approach and could be seen halfway to the objective by 10 am or so. About 100 m short and below the objective Major Cheema reported to me the existence of an ice overhang due to which they were unable to proceed further. I suggested a diversion skirting the overhang and conveyed to him accordingly. Captain Sinha was on the listening too. Once they were past the spot of the ice overhang, I could not observe their movements further towards the objective. I spoke to both the officers and told them that no enemy movements were observed till then and wished them all the best for the final assault, the last 50 metres. We had planned the H hr around 2 pm. It was the longest wait ever in my life. All seemed normal, all quiet all around except the” noise of silence”. My buddy Naik ( later Hony Captain)Madan Singh offered me a cup of tea. Late Major( later Colonel) Maniraj was also with me at the command post observing me and my anxiety!
At about 2 Pm we heard the explosions, the firing and all that followed in a close quarter battle situation. I knew that Lord Hanuman had blessed us. Later I learnt that one of our boys had used the PIKA gun of the enemy for fire support when our own LMG malfunctioned at a very crucial time. A few enemy soldiers who were caught totally surprised were neutralized as they tried to run away. Some of them fell down towards their side of the slope. Fortune favours the braves. Point 5770 was captured in a matter of 20-25 minutes of fighting without a single casualty to own troops. The calculated risk paid off handsomely.
Major Cheema tried to contact me on line and through radio to inform me of the success but couldn’t do so at this critical juncture. He was able to contact Major ( Later Brigadier )VS Yadav to convey the message to me immediately. We had done it and our boys did what seemed impossible to others. Still the most cherished news was that there were No casualties to own troops, not a scratch at the time of capture. I immediately spoke to my commander who congratulated us for the success. The enemy was known to carry out very quick counter attacks in the past. All our troops were alerted for the same.
It took no longer than 20 minutes for the enemy artillery to bring down a very heavy volume of fire on our troops including my position and the our deployments nearby. I estimated that around 300-400 rounds of field and medium enemy artillery rounds falling in our vicinity right through the afternoon and the evening.
Among the dead enemy soldiers was one Captain Taimur malik with his ID card and a letter written by his mother and his own letter written to his father, a retired brigadier. His body alongwith four others were handed over to the Pakistani soldiers in Kargil area nearly a month after they were buried under the snow in point 5770. The initial order for me was to retrieve the body of the officer only. However, on my insistence the bodies of the dead soldiers of 3 NLI were also retrieved. I was later told that the grandfather of the officer had approached our embassy in London for the body of Captain Taimur Malik. Point 5770 is now renamed “ Navdeep Top” after the gallant leader of the assaulting troops Major Navdeep Singh Cheema of my unit.
Many lessons can be drawn from this battle by military researchers. The most important lesson from this success is the audacity of our soldiers ably led by young lions like Major Cheema and Captain Sinha. Need to take calculated risk in war and maintaining the surprise are few tactical lessons one should aim for in war. I remain proud of all officers and men whom I had the privilege to be with during the war and later all through the period in the one year of Siachen glacier tenure of the unit. What more can one ask for as a Commanding officer, when we had victory at our feet, the ultimate joy of the INFANTRY.
(The author is from 52 NDA/ 62 IMA Course and was commissioned into 2 RAJPUT in Jun 1978. He became the first officer from Manipur to become a Brigadier and then the first officer from North East to become a Lt General. He Commanded 16 Corps and thereafter was Commandant Infantry School, Mhow )
