The Tangail Drop

In August 1971, I was given command of 50 (Indep) Para Brigade. I was at the time Commandant of the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairengte in Mizoram. I relieved Brig T.S. Oberoi VrC, Cdr 50 Indep Para Brigade at the time, an old and valued friend and distinguished colleague who was proceeding to take over an organisation of the Special Frontier Force (Establishment 22) — located at Chakrata.
HQ 50 (Indep) Para Brigade and its three Para Battalions were located at the time in and around Calcutta while the rest of the Brigade was at Agra, its base. The Brigade HQ and the Battalions were operating in Aid to Civil Power (Op Hot Spot). The ops were aimed at locating, apprehending / eliminating pockets of a Left Wing Marxist-inspired, banned underground organisation, loosely referred to as the ‘Naxalite Movement’, who were attempting to overthrow the legitimate state government of West Bengal by armed insurrection.
However by Aug 1971, due to sustained operations, the Naxalite Movement had been ‘contained’ in West Bengal.Meanwhile across the International Border in East Pakistan trouble was brewing in alarming proportions.
The political situation in this Eastern Wing of Pakistan was volatile. There was resentment and a growing unrest amongst the Bengali Muslims at the hegemonistic attitude and the step-motherly treatment meted out by the Punjabi dominated West Pakistan to its Eastern Wing.
The Awami League with its charismatic leader Sheikh Mujibur Rehman had won an overwhelming victory at the recent elections and was to be installed as the leader of the ruling party.
The National Assembly was to be summoned by President Yaha Khan and transfer of power to the National Assembly and the “Six Point Programme” implemented. President Yaha Khan however wished to retain power for himself and the Pakistan Army.
Instead of following the democratic process, he secretly ordered reinforcement of troops from West Pakistan via Sri Lanka to maintain the status quo ante. He appointed Lt Gen Sahabzada Yaqub Khan as the Governor of East Pakistan.
This triggered a civil disobedience movement spear-headed by the Awami League. Lt Gen Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was replaced by ‘strong man’ Lt Gen Tikka Khan, who had earlier, with ruthless military efficiency, suppressed the civil disturbances in Baluchistan, earning him the sobriquet ‘The Butcher of Baluchistan’. Lt Gen Tikka Khan was expected to do the same in East Pakistan.
On 23 March 1971, in the wake of demonstrations in Dacca and in the smaller towns, as a result of the postponement once more of the meeting of the National Assembly, ‘Bangladesh Flags’ were hoisted all over East Pakistan and ‘Independence’ proclaimed.
President Yaha Khan flew back to West Pakistan on 25 March. Gen Tikka Khan, thereafter, commenced his ‘crack down’ at 0100 hrs 25 March. Firing between the two factions commenced as West Pakistan troops moved into the city from Dacca Cantt. Op ‘Search Light’ had commenced. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman proclaimed the birth of the ‘Peoples Republic of Bangladesh’ over a radio broadcast. But inevitably the Capital Dacca succumbed to West Pakistan forces. Casualties were several thousands.
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was arrested at 0100 hrs 26 March. Three days later, he was flown to Karachi, where he was incarcerated. Other Bengali leaders managed to escape. Despite heroic stands by Officers of Bengali Muslim origin, such as Maj Ziaur Rehman of 8th Battalion East Bengal Regt at Chittagong and other units such as the 1st Battalion of the East Bengal Regt at Jessore, the East Pakistan Rifles Wing at Pabna, the 2nd Battalion East Bengal Regt at Joydehpur north of Dacca, with elements in TANGAIL and MYMENSINGH, forces opposing the regular Pak Army fell back to safer locations closer to the India- East Pakistan border or disintegrated against the onslaught of superior forces.
The crack down in East Pakistan had its repercussions in India. There was public outcry and demands for immediate intervention, as besides Bengali Muslims, there was an estimated ten million Bengali Hindus in East Pakistan as well.
On 31 March 1971, the Indian Parliament passed a resolution calling on Pakistan to transfer power to the legally elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan.
The West Pakistan atrocities on the people of East Pakistan and the large scale influx of refugees (both Hindu and Muslim) into India, which from a few thousands in March, was to swell to several million in April-June (by Oct 1971 the figure was somewhere in the region of 10 million) and with the influx continuing till October, was a great financial strain on India and held wider demographic implications for India’s West Bengal, Assam and Tripura.
In April 1971 itself, the Govt of India was convinced that military intervention would be necessary. The COAS, General SHFJ Maneckshaw, PVSM, MC after prolonged discussions with HQ Eastern Command at Calcutta and the Ministry of Defence at Delhi, decided that despite provocations and the need for immediate intervention on political grounds, the earliest a military intervention could commence was after the monsoon, with a delay for the areas over which the operations were being planned to dry out, possibly by year’s end.
Besides, time was required for training of troops (Eastern Command ORBAT had Mountain Divisions, with little or no bridging equipment and very little transport) in warfare in the plains and in the the riverine areas ; for ensuring adequate force levels were available to defend the India-China border in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim and for ensuring that a force level of adequate size and punch was able to contain the insurgency-prone areas of India’s North Eastern Region (NER).
Besides, it was apparent from western shades of opinion, that at the time (April 1971), International opinion was not supportive of the Independence movement in East Pakistan. Nor was the International press convinced of the atrocities committed on both the Bengali Muslim and Hindu population of East Pakistan, by their so-called brothers from West Pakistan.
Meanwhile the liberation struggle in East Pakistan continued. Elements of the East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistan Rifles, Freedom Fighters (Mukti Bahini), Guerrilla Forces (such as ‘Tiger Siddiqui’s in and around TANGAIL), outnumbered and outgunned, were being pushed back towards the Indian side of the International Border.
The newly formed “Bangladesh Government in Exile” finally established itself in BANGAON. 50 (Indep) Para Brigade Readies for Operations 50 (Indep) Para Brigade committed to Op ‘HOT SPOT’ was relieved of its duties in West Bengal and earmarked as Theatre Reserve for Op ‘Cactus Lily’ with effect 18 Aug 1971. Between 19 and 21 Aug, units of the Brigade which had remained at its base at Agra were ordered to join the Brigade for ‘Op Cactus Lily’ (Impending hostilities with Pakistan).
Meanwhile a rigorous training schedule for both airborne and ground operations was set in motion.I carried out a study of the terrain over which, whether in the airborne or ground role, the Brigade would have to operate.
My BM, Maj Narendra Sobti (17 Para Field Regiment) and my GSO 2 (Air), Maj JCM ‘Jimmy’ Rao (1 Para), both high grade and thoroughly capable staff officers, helped me in this study. What emerged was that East Pakistan was low lying, water logged and interspersed by rivers, many of which were tidal.
The general flow of the rivers was from North to South. Many areas especially in the delta region were swampy. Rice being the staple diet, vast areas were under rice cultivation. Jute was also grown extensively. The major rivers were the Padma (Ganga), the Brahmaputra (Jamuna) and the Meghna. Areas were heavily flooded in the monsoon, after which it took many weeks for the waters to recede and areas to dry.
Consequently during the monsoon period June to October vehicular movement was well-nigh impossible and Infantry movement with supporting arms restricted, the implication being that this was not the period for the launching of operations. The defender on the other hand, during this period, was facilitated by the few bridges over the water obstacles and the crossings where ferries operated, which he could defend.
The flow of the major rivers divided the whole territory into the following easily defined sectors.
(a) North Western Sector – North of the River Padma and West of the River Brahmaputra. The major towns in this sector were DINAJPUR, RANGPUR, BOGRA, and RAJSHASHI.
(b) Western Sector – South and West of River Padma. The major towns were Jessore, Faridpur, Kushtia, and the river port of Khulna.
(c) South Eastern Sector – East of River Meghna. Major towns were Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong, the latter being the major port of East Pakistan.
(d) North Eastern Sector – East of River Brahmaputra and West of River Meghna. The major town was the capital Dacca.
From Intelligence Summaries it was learnt the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, at the time of the crack down, had built up to almost four Infantry Divisions (35 Regular Infantry Battalions), Seven Wings of Para- Military Forces (PMF) from the West, several companies of the Industrial Protection Force (IPF) and large numbers of ‘Irregulars’.
Supporting Artillery consisted of six Field Regiments, a number of Independent Field and Heavy Mortar Batteries and Light Anti–Aircraft Artillery. Resources in Armour was confined to one Regiment of Chaffee Tanks (US origin) plus an Independent Squadron and one ad hoc Squadron composed of Chaffee and PT- 76 (Russian Origin) tanks. The Air Force had 25 Sabre Jet Fighters (US Origin) and the Navy a number of Gun Boats.
The Bengali element of the of the Army in East Pakistan consisted of five battalions of the East Bengal Regiment (EBR) and the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), both mainly officered and manned by Bengali Muslims. There were a number of Bengali Irregulars as well, such as the Mujahids and Razakars.
It was appreciated at the time that the East Pakistan Forces’ strategy would be to defend the border lightly and fight their main battle defending communication centres, major towns and cities, which offered natural defensive potential.
Pakistan’s appreciation of Indian intentions was that India would aim to seize a sizable portion of East Pakistan territory, in order to set up a Bangladesh Govt in Exile and then negotiate for a major devolution of power to the Eastern Wing.
After an assessment of forces required to maintain the balance on the India-China border in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, an emergency situation in Bhutan, for CI Ops in the North Eastern Region, Eastern Command was able to make the following troops available for operations against East Pakistan.
(a) 8 Mountain Division ( 2 x Infantry Brigades from Nagaland)
(b) 23 Mountain Division ex 4 Corps.
(c) 20 Mountain Division ex 33 Corps
(d) 57 Mountain Division ex MIZO HILLS
(e) 95 Mountain Brigade
Army HQ Indicated that 9 Infantry Division, 4 Mountain Division, 340 Mountain Brigade Group and a Battalion Group of 50 Indep Para Brigade from Army HQ Reserve, would also be available for operations, besides the above.
In a closed door session with the GOC in C Eastern Command, Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, PVSM, a veteran paratrooper, sometime in Sep 1971, the Army Commander discussed on a one to one with me the various possibilities for the use of 50 Indep Para Brigade both in the airborne and ground role in Op ‘Cactus Lily’.
It transpired that the Air Force could at best provide us with a Favourable Air Situation (in the event they provided Air Superiority) and a mix of transport aircraft to drop a Parachute Battalion Group and one to two Task Forces comprising a Tactical HQ and two Rifle Companies, a week following ‘D’ Day.
The question of a ‘Coup de Main’ such as the capture of Kurmitola Airfield (Dacca) by an Airborne Assault Operation and thereafter fly in the rest of the Brigade in the air transported role, to assist in the battle for Dacca, was also considered.
A major air effort would be required for this latter task and such an operation could only be executed towards the closing stages of the war to hasten the end, especially if world opinion and UN Security Council pressure was mounting for a ceasefire, particularly if Dacca was threatened and ripe for the taking.
The Army Commander suggested that the Battalion Group Airborne Assault Operation was best utilised in the North Eastern Sector where he hoped to have a sizeable force advancing on the Jamalpur-Tangail-Dacca Axis.
This was the shortest route to Dacca and one which did not have any major obstacles. Areas that could be used as DZs existed in the vicinity of TANGAIL and the FERRY over the LOHAJANG River, from where own forces once established, could interdict Pak Forces withdrawing from JAMALPUR and MYMENSINGH and falling back to defend DACCA.
Tiger SIDDIQUI with a large band of guerrillas was operating in this area. He could assist the Battalion Group in its initial task and later when the link-up with own advancing forces was effected, could assist in the ‘Battle for Dacca’.
In the event, on this axis, due to paucity of troops, only 95 Mountain Brigade was to advance under the operational control of 101 Communication Zone Area, based in Shillong.
This Brigade Group was later augmented with 67 Mountain Brigade and 6 Bihar a Battalion of FJ Sector, all forming a part of IOI Communication Zone Area.
Commander 95 Mountain Brigade was Brig H S Kler (Signals) a paratrooper and the GOC 101 Comn Zone Area was Maj Gen Gurbaksh Singh (4th Gurkhas), a high calibre military leader of repute.It was agreed that the Task Force (Tactical HQ with two Company Groups ) was best utilised in the Western Sector, where 9 Infantry Division and 4 Mountain Division were to capture Jessore, Magura and Faridpur. 2 Corps was to be raised to command these two divisions.
Its command was to be vested in Lt Gen T N Raina MVC, PVSM a veteran paratrooper (later to be the COAS). These task forces were to be utilized for furthering the advance of 2 Corps across the bottle necks and rivers that could well hold up their progress.
The time frame for these operations would depend on the ability of the IAF to achieve a ‘Favourable Air Situation’ over the sector of operations, or in a best case scenario, ‘Air Superiority’ over the Theatre of Operations.
The progress of the ground operations would have to be fine tuned to fit in with the airborne assault(s), as it was imperative that the Link-Up between the Airborne Assault Forces and the Ground Forces should in the case of the Double Company Task Forces be 12 to 24 hrs and in the case of the Battalion Group Task Force 24 to 36 hrs at the outside, failing which the force would have to reform into small parties and ex-filtrate back to friendly forces locations on own side of FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area).
The question of aircraft availability was considered. Most of the men of the Para Brigade were trained to jump from the C-119 Fairchild Packet (US origin) that could carry 42 paratroops plus a couple of door-loads on ‘skids’.
However there were insufficient numbers of these aircraft modified for paratrooping. Besides, a number of these would be required for ‘heavy-drop’ of guns and eqpt. So one had to fall back on the WW 2 vintage ‘Flying Mule’, the C-47 Dakota (US Origin), from which 20 to 24 paratroops could jump from a single door (as opposed to the two-door exit from the C-119).
Besides, containers lashed to the bottom of the aircraft containing heavy weapons and equipment could simultaneously be dropped. However a large percentage of the Brigade’s paratroops were not trained in para dropping from the C-47 Dakota and this would pose a problem.
The newly inducted AN-12 (Russian Origin) was to phase out the C-119 both for para trooping and the heavy drop of guns and equipment. These aircraft i.e, the AN 12, flew at higher speeds and the para drop was from a greater height, both factors necessitating the use of a special type of parachute.
The exit was also different, in that you went out through the rear in two ‘sticks’ side by side and the technique of exit was more difficult than that of the more familiar C-119 or for that matter the C-47. Besides, only a proportion of the Brigade personnel were aware of the technique of parachuting from the AN-12. This aircraft therefore was best suited for heavy drop and resupply.
The third type of transport aircraft available was the CARIBOU (Canadian Origin), from which very few of the brigade’s personnel had parachuted. However the CARIBOU’s were to prove useful in a different context, about which later !An assessment of available air-fields for mounting airborne operations was made. There was BARRACKPORE (Fighter Base), KALAIKUNDA (Fighter Base) and DUM-DUM (Calcutta’s Civil Airport).
The former two did not have the type of security problems that the latter had. DUM DUM being an International Airport, could NOT be closed until the very last moment to civilian traffic.
The mounting of an Airborne Assault Operation using this airport therefore had significant disadvantages.
The question of the selection of Drop Zones was considered. There would be one MAIN and one ALTERNATE DZ. Air Photographs of these would be necessary well before D Day. The Army Commander asked my views on which Battalion of the Brigade I felt was equal to the task of spearheading the airborne assault operation on either TANGAIL or DACCA ? 2 Para (Maratha) was the obvious choice – an outstanding battalion with an impressive war record and almost 175 years of regimental soldiering world wide behind them.
The Commanding Officer was Lt Col Kulwant Singh Pannu, a bold and capable leader, who was to create history subsequently in more ways than one.
In the third week of Oct 1971, I was called up to Army HQ to discuss the proposed airborne operations with Army and Air HQ. I had a preliminary discussion with the Director of Military Operations (DMO) Maj Gen Inder Singh Gill PVSM, MC who was also the Colonel of the Parachute Regiment.
He was fully aware of the pros and cons involved in executing the intended airborne tasks, nevertheless heard me out my assessment and proposals patiently. He cleared a lot of my doubts with suggestions as to what was practically feasible.
Finally we had a plan for the use of paratroops should a war situation be thrust on us. On the same day, 21 Oct 1971, the DMO and I attended a discussion in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff (ACAS) Operations, Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Datigara, at Air HQs.
The envisaged Airborne tasks were spelt out on this occasion. It transpired at this discussion that up to D plus 3 the IAF would be committed solely in the gaining of air superiority.
Therefore any Airborne Operation would only be feasible D plus 5 onwards, as between D plus 3 and D plus 5, the transport aircraft that were needed for paratrooping and heavy drop would have to be moved from base airfields to interim airfields and only thereafter to mounting airfields.
Secondly on D plus 5, in case a Battalion Group drop was to take place, it would have to be in two waves, the first wave of aircraft returning to pick up the second wave and drop them on the same DZs the same night.
However, a Task Force of a Tac HQ and two Rifle Company Groups, could be mounted in an Airborne Operation on D plus 5. The lift of an entire Parachute Battalion Group would only be possible on D plus 7, while the lift of a Parachute Battalion Group for an Airborne Assault Operation and the subsequent fly-in of the remainder Brigade in the Air-Transported mode, would only be feasible on or after D plus 14.
As far as mounting airfields were concerned, Barrackpore was considered unsuitable. Only DUM DUM could take the C-119 and AN-12 aircraft, while KALAIKUNDA could take the C-47 and the CARIBOU. The requirement of Air Photographs of DZs and target areas could be met only after D Day.
The advantages of a ‘Dummy Drop’ as a deceptive measure was discussed. This should be sufficiently far away from the actual DZ and target area to divert the attention of the enemy from the actual drop location and target area.
It was possible for the ADR&DE Agra, to organise dummies fitted with pyrotechnics that could be ejected from Caribou aircraft with the pyrotechnics activating on a time basis. This measure was agreed to and I was asked to go ahead and liaise with the ADR&DE, Agra on this account and get things moving.
The question of resupply of ammunition, essential war-like spares and medicine, hours after the completion of the initial drop, using the same DZs posed more problems. The DZs had to be protected for 24 hours and cleared after the supply drop, with troops having to carry the supplies to battle positions.
Resupply for the Tactical HQ and two Company Groups was not considered necessary as the link-up was planned to be effective in 12 hours.
An Advance Headquarters Eastern Air Command was set up alongside the Army’s Headquarters Eastern Command at Fort William, Calcutta, This was necessitated as Headquarters Eastern Air Command was located at Shillong. A Joint Planning Cell was to be located at the Advance Headquarters consisting of staff both from 50 Indep Para Brigade and the IAF.
An Airborne Task Force Commander (Brig Mathew Thomas, Commander 50 Indep Para Brigade ) and an Air Transport Force Commander (Gp Capt Gurdip Singh from the IAF) was to be nominated for joint planning and execution of the envisaged tasks and would function at the Advance Headquarters Eastern Air Command.
An Army/Air Headquarters Joint Directive for Airborne Operations in the Eastern Theatre would be issued in due course.I came away from the discussion in good heart. There was very close rapport between the Army’s DMO and the IAF’s ACAS (Ops).
Both were high grade professionals with loads of combat experience between them. I was convinced that the Indep Para Bde would get total support both from the Army and Air HQ in the planning and execution of the Indian Army’s maiden Airborne Assault Operation !!Back at the Indep Para Brigade HQ located of necessity in the Howrah Jute Mills due the Brigade’s current role in Aid to Civil Authority, I briefed my senior staff officers of what had transpired at Army and Air HQ and emphasized that we should get cracking on finalizing our plans and go ahead with our preparations.
I had by this time decided that 8 Para commanded by Lt Col Afsir Karim was to provide the Task Force of a Tactical HQ and two Rifle Company Groups for the airborne operation in support of 2 Corps.
Afsir Karim a fine dependable Battalion Commander was originally from the Kumaon Regt, to which Lt Gen ‘Tappy” Raina, the 2 Corps Commander belonged and I felt that this regimental affinity would be advantageous in ensuring the Task Force’s projection at the correct time, its support by ground and air forces and the crucial link-up effected by the stipulated time.
7 Para commanded by Lt Col R P Singh was at this time located in Rampurhat (Birbhum District) and involved in training a number of ‘Mukti Bahini’ Volunteers. I could not therefore involve this battalion in the proposed airborne operations.
However in case Dacca was to be taken by airborne assault, 7 Para would certainly form a part of the air transported element of the Brigade.In the meanwhile, during the period 26-28 October 1971, Maj JCM ‘Jimmy’ Rao the GSO 2 (Air) and Capt Shamsher Singh the GSO 3 (Air) had been working industriously on the requirement of heavy drop and supply drop equipment for the airborne operations.
The 2IC 2 Para (Maratha) Maj ‘Jumbo’ Bhadha and the Adjutant Capt Nirbhay Sharma, two excellent, conscientious, hard working staff officers, closely worked with the former to finalise these demands, which were subsequently projected to Army HQ (MO Dte).
The Brigade’s requirement of Air Photos of DZs and Target Areas were projected to HQ Eastern Command as well. These would only be available after D Day, for obvious reasons.On 29 Oct 1971 the Army/Air HQ Joint Directive for Airborne Operations in the Eastern Theatre was issued. It was jointly signed by Lt Gen Har Prasad, VCOAS and Air Marshal Chatterjee, DCAS.
The following Airfields were formally allocated.DUM DUM – For C-119 and AN 12 aircraftKALAIKUNDA – For C-47 Dakota & CARIBOU aircraft.
On 4 November 1971, a Joint Planning Cell was established at Advance HQ Eastern Air Command manned by IAF Officers and Officers of 50 Para Brigade i.e., the GSO 2 and GSO 3 (Air), with requisite staff.
On 12 November requirements and arrangements necessary at the two mounting airfields (Dum Dum and Kalaikunda) were projected to HQ Eastern Command. This included the Transit Camp organisation, Staff and other administrative elements required for efficient running of the Camp.
On 13 Nov 1971, I held an operational conference for the first time, of selected commanding officers of the brigade units, to discuss the projected airborne tasks.
The u/m unit commanders attended.17 Para Field Regt2 Para, 7 Para, 8 Para (Battalions)411 Para Field Company (Bombay Sappers)50 Indep Para Brigade Signal Company I brought the Unit Cdrs unto date on events leading up to the intended use of airborne forces in a war situation with Pakistan in the Eastern Theatre.
The restrictions imposed by the IAF in terms of time (NOT before D plus 5) and the available air effort which had the capability to lift one Battalion Group in two waves, or a single Task Force of a Tactical HQ and two Rifle Company Groups, on D plus 5 ; a Battalion Group on D plus 7; an Airborne Assault Operation to seize Kurmitola Airfield by a Battalion Group and fly in a proportion of the remainder Brigade in the air transported mode could NOT be launched before D plus 14.
All these were explained to those present. I said that the first two projected tasks was in support of 101 Communication Zone Area and 2 Corps respectively, i.e. in direct support of 95 Mountain Brigade and 4 Infantry Division and that the target areas were TANGAIL and the Ferry Crossings across the Madhumati River in the JHENIDA/ MAGHURA area, respectively.
The third task was unlikely to materialize, for reasons which I explained in brief, but emphasized that we should be prepared for it and outline plans made for such an eventuality.
I then discussed in some detail the manner in which the 2 Para operation would be mounted and how best it could be executed. The grouping for 2 Para would include:Field Battery (ex 17 Para Fied Regiment Artillery)Platoon Engineers (ex 411 Para Field Company — Bombay Sappers) Mobile Surgical Team (Ex 60 Para Field Ambulance) Air Control Team with TCL Other Elements
In case the Airborne Assault Operation had to be executed in two waves, the second wave which would be utilizing the returning aircraft, would have to load and emplane some time in the hours of darkness, before dawn.
The same DZ would have to be used as for the first wave and hopefully would be cleared of vehicles, guns, mortars, RCLs, MMGs, etc., dropped in the first wave before the second wave emplaned, flown to the same DZ and dropped.
Surprise would have been lost and the first half-battalion of 2 Para (Maratha) must ensure that the target areas and the DZ were secure before the second half of the battalion dropped — a tall order, but Lt Col Pannu was not fazed! I then discussed other aspects of the ground plan including the linking up with ‘Tiger’ Siddiqui and 95 Mtn Bde for the advance towards Dacca.
My only prayer at this moment in time was that 2 Para Bn Gp would be dropped in one wave on D plus 7 rather than the high risk two waves drop on D plus 5. This prayer was eventually answered.
Pannu’s major comment at the end of this part of the briefing was “2 Para would be the first to enter Dacca !”As far as the 8 Para Task Force was concerned, I indicated the Mission, the possible time frame (D plus 5), air effort available, mounting airfields and arrangements for link-up with 4 Infantry Division.
A detailed briefing would be given the Task Force Cdr, Lt Col Afsir Karim, by HQ 2 Corps. Asfir Karim had some comments/suggestions and questions which were partially cleared at this juncture.
On 16 Nov 71 the final Joint Army/Air Plan for Airborne Ops in the Eastern Theatre was issued. It was signed by Maj Gen JFR Jacob, Chief of Staff, HQ Eastern Command and AVM CG Devasher, SASO, HQ Eastern Air Comd.On 18 Nov 1971, IAF Parachute Jump Instructors, (PJIs as they were affectionately referred to by the ‘Maroon’ Berets), arrived at Calcutta from the Parachute Training School (PTS) Agra, to impart training in the ‘exit techniques’ from the C-47 Dakota, (which aircraft incidentally was being phased out from the IAF for paratrooping) and in the servicing of airborne equipment.
The training continued unto 11 Dec 1971. In order to maintain secrecy of plans, 2 and 8 Para Battalions were secretly dispatched in groups to Agra for Refresher Training from the C-47 and C-119 Aircraft.50 Indep Para Brigade was now in high gear.
Final preparations were underway for the airborne assault operations. Being an AHQ Reserve Formation, located in Eastern Command, with a Battalion Group and a Task Force consisting of half a battalion committed to airborne missions, I was fairly sure that the remaining truncated Brigade Group would be committed to a ground role.
I felt at the time that this task could be handled by the Deputy Brigade Commander, Col SW Scudder, an officer senior to me in service and no doubt experience, while I could with my IO and GSO 3 (Air), jump with the Assault Battalion Group and consequently be in a position, on completion of the operation, to give an holistic view of the planning and execution of such an operation, for future operations of this nature, to Command /Army HQ’s, with both its positive and negative aspects.
I did not of course divulge these thoughts to those present at the briefing, but did mention these sentiments to the DMO Maj Gen I S Gill, in his capacity as the ‘Colonel of the Para Regt’, who was non-committal, but was ‘Gung Ho’ with this line of thought.
At a later stage, when I discussed this line of thought with the Chief of Staff HQ Eastern Command, Lt Gen JFR Jacob, he smiled and said that he had an equally important task planned for me, which he would discuss with me at a later stage. But in the turmoil of battle and fast pace of the Indian Army’s moves towards Dacca on all fronts, I was to be sent off on a wild goose chase with no apparent necessity, on a hook to relieve the strain on 9 Infantry Divisions assault on Jessore, resulting in unnecessary casualties to Officers, NCOs and men of the Para Brigade, before the Brigade was turned around willy-nilly, airlifted from Dum Dum to Delhi and thereafter moved secretly at night by rail to the Western Theatre (Bathinda/Fazilka) where 11 Corps under Lt Gen Naveen Chand Rawlley, MC was being stretched beyond limits and the Indarmy’s powerful 1 Armoured Division was secreted in the sugarcane fields, awaiting orders.
Meanwhile some of the units awaiting deployment with their formations were being utilized for supporting the Mukti Bahini in their border skirmishes. 17 Para Field Regiment t (less 49 Field Battery ) was consequently committed to a ground role and were occupying gun positions at Hakimpur and Gojadanja in the 9 Infantry Division Sector where troops were attempting to prevent enemy incursions into own areas and were prepared to go on the offensive should opportunity offer.
This high profile Regiment, with a high grade Commanding Officer, Lt Col Prem Chandra, gave an excellent account of their proficiency in gunnery in supporting the sector and in the process destroying a number of enemy bunkers and in killing or incapacitating a number of enemy personnel.It was in the realms of possibility that the depleted Para Brigade would be allotted to 2 Corps in support of either 4 or 9 Infantry Division at a crucial juncture of their operations.
I had a fair idea of what these Divisions were tasked to do, knew both the GOCs rather well (Maj Gen Dalbir Singh and Maj Gen Brar) and was prepared to assist either of them with my somewhat depleted strength.
Would I be made unto strength with supporting Armour and Artillery so that I could be effective? I hoped so, but in the event I was not and sent off like a lame duck on tasks which seemed to materialize out of the thin air! But more about that in a later memoir.
The Para Brigade staff by this time had worked out the requirement of Offensive Air Support and Maintenance Supply for the Airborne Forces. These were projected to HQ Eastern Command on 20 Nov 71.
Meanwhile as a result of the Mukti Bahini and elements of the East Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Rifles who had defected, operating across the IB, Pak artillery in retaliation, commenced shelling our Border Out Posts.
A policy decision was therefore taken in Nov 71, to allow own troops to go into East Pak to a depth of 10 miles, to silence these guns. Our Formations took advantage of this policy to improve our offensive posture, which paid off once open hostilities commenced and war was declared.
On 20 Nov 1971, I proceeded by air to Gauhati and thereafter by road to Shillong, to HQ 101 Communication Zone Area, to discuss with the GOC, Maj Gen Gurbaksh Singh, the ground operational plans, once 2 Para Bn Gp having completed their airborne assault operation came under command of 95 Mtn Bde and link-up affected.
Lt Col Kulwant Singh Pannu was NOT one of the General Officer’s favorites ! At the Defense Services Staff College where Gurbaksh then a Colonel was the Chief Instructor (Army), Pannu as a student was notorious in that he chain-smoked, never wore a turban off parade hours and rarely attended Sunday prayers at the Gurudwara.
Gurbaksh as a devout practicing Sikh, did not savor such behavior. But all credit to the General Officer, when I explained that Pannu was a competent leader and would do exceptionally well in war, the General forgot his prejudices and supported the projected plans and leadership wholeheartedly.
I suggested that the link-up with 2 Para Bn Gp with the ground forces on completion of their task, be effected with the JANGI PALTAN (1st Bn The Mahratta LI) who was a part of the link-up bde and was a sister battalion to 2 Para (Maratha), who until the formation of the Para Regt (1952), was 3/5th Mahratta L I (Para).
Gen Gurbaksh agreed to recommend this to Brig Hardev Singh Kler the Bde Cdr. I was confident that this would materialise, which it did !I then took up a matter that I had been keeping close to my heart – the infiltration of a Bengali Officer with a powerful radio detachment manned by a Bengali speaking crew into East Pakistan, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, to locate and liaise with ‘Tiger’ Siddiqui in the Tangail area and persuade him to participate in the INDARMY’s further operations, leading to the capture of Dacca.
Gen Gurbaksh inquired whether I had identified such an Officer in the Bde equal to the task ? I said I had — Capt P K Ghosh of the Bde Sig Coy, who was not only competent but bold and adventurous enough to lead and accomplish the task of such a mission. I gave the General the outline of the plan I had in mind. He gave it some thought, said it was a good idea, bold in concept but difficult in its execution.
The plan was to infiltrate Capt Ghosh and his Detachment of two Radio Operators with a GR 345 (RS) (Long Range) to the Tangail Area to seek out and contact ‘Tiger’ Siddiqui and get his coop for assistance to 95 Mtn Bde in the advance towards Dacca. Capt Ghosh was NOT to be told of the location of the Para Drop nor the date of drop, so that in case of his capture, he would not be in a position to divulge this crucial information, even under duress.
We agreed on a date when Capt Ghosh would be dispatched to Shillong together with his detachment, on temporary duty, unaware of his task. What was of some concern was that both his wife and family were not to be informed of his mission.
Gen Gurbakhsh would subsequently brief him and launch him on his mission. After tying up these details I returned to my HQs in the Howrah Jute Mills in Calcutta.On 23 Nov 1971, HQ Eastern Command informed my Bde HQ that the Transit camp arrangements at DUM DUM and KALAIKUNDA would be the Para Bde’s responsibility. I was not in the least bit happy but accepted the inevitable.
After a discussion with the Bde staff, the OCs 5050 Coy ASC Compo (Para) and 2 (Indep) Para Fd Wksp were made responsible for setting up and functioning the Transit Camps at DUM DUM and KALAIKUNDA respectively.
In the event they did a magnificent job. The same day a Det RASO was made available at DUM DUM to pack ammunition incl resupply ammunition for the Airborne Force.
The Para Drop and RallyThe Battalion Group took off from DUM DUM and KALAIKUNDA airfields on 11 Dec 1971 at 1423 hrs preceded by the PATHFINDERS who took off earlier at 1403 hrs from DUM DUM.
The PATHFINDERS were dropped from C-119 aircraft at 1540 hrs. This drop was wide-spread over a distance of 2 1/2 miles. After a reasonably quick RV, despite the spread, the PATHFINDERS marked the DZ and were ready to receive the main drop at 1555 hrs.
After this the Supply Drop, the Heavy Drop and Paratroops followed in the above sequence. The entire Battalion Group including the Supply and Heavy Drop completed the drop at 1650 hrs. The drop was, all things considered, very satisfactory.
However, the following aircraft loads were not dropped at all :-1 X C-119 consisting of one Officer, one JCO and 38 paratroopers.1 X C-119 consisting of 1 X 75 mm Pack How.
Of the above, the first serial was dropped on the objective the next day, at 1600 hrs 12 Dec 71. The Officer and JCO belonged to 49 Para Field Regt and were disappointed that they would not be available to support the initial action on 11 Dec 71.
As a result one of the assaulting companies could not be provided with an FOO (Forward Observation Officer).
(a) 1 X C – 47 consisting of one JCO and 18 OR were dropped about 16 miles North of the DZ near KALIHATI. These troops were fired upon while parachuting down.
They had to fight their way, against sporadic enemy intervention and were only able to join the Battalion on 12 Dec 71 at 1600 hrs.
(b) 1 X C – 119 consisting of 2 X 75 mm Pack How and 2 X Jeeps, dropped its load, less 1 X 75 mm Pack How, 4 miles South of the DZ. 1 X 75 mm Pack How was not dropped at all.
The heavy loads could only be collected from the DZ on 12 Dec 1971, as on 11 Dec 1971, the enemy was still holding out at TANGAIL and there was no info on the 12 Dec that TANGAIL had been evacuated.
One paratrooper was a ‘hung-up’ case from a C-119. He was ‘hung-up’ with the aircraft tail section for 20 minutes and was eventually dropped by the help of a safety parachute near SARA Airfield.
The paratrooper was injured during the hang-up and on parachuting down was fired upon by enemy troops. He was able to evade the enemy after an evasive move of about 10 miles.
He spent 3 days in hiding assisted by friendly locals, after which he joined a party of the Mukti Bahini operating in the area. He carried his 2 in mortar and sten gun with him all this while. Together with the Mukti Bahini he took part in three raids against Pak Razakars, the last one as late as 27 Dec 71.
This was on a group of 35 Razakars, encountered in the same area where he had initially landed, after being released from his ‘hung up’ position. After this action he was able to collect his own parachute and equipment which he had secreted earlier.
He now made contact with 65 Mountain Brigade and subsequently rejoined the Battalion on 02 Jan 1972. His was an exemplary example of enterprise and devotion to duty for which he was later commended.
Due to these heavy loads dropping away from the DZ, or not dropping at all, only 4 X 75 mm Pack How were available to the Battalion for the initial action on 11 and 12 Dec 1971.
After 12 Dec 1971, 5 X 75 mm Pack How were available for subsequent actions. These guns and crew proved their worth in carrying out their tasks with battlefield efficiency.
Of the remaining heavy loads, 4 X Jeeps landed in fairly deep ponds. These were dragged out with the help of locals and own personnel, thereafter serviced and made available for action by first light 12 Dec 71.
The Battalion Group carried out the practiced RV Drill and crossed the Checkpoint at 1815 hrs as per the Order of March.
GROUND OPERATIONS
On 11 Dec 71, after crossing the Checkpoint, the Battalion less D Company moved quickly towards the selected Forming Up Plamce. C Company secured the FUP by 1930 hrs. Locals, available as guides, provided reliable info about Pak tps at BRIDGE, FERRY and TANGAIL. Meanwhile D Coy had also secured its FUP. The objectives, BRIDGE and FERRY, were held by a platoon each reinforced by some RAZAKARS.
Both objectives were captured by 2000 hrs 11 Dec 71. Only minor opposition was encountered.The Battalion quickly organised for all round defence at the BRIDGE.
The localities were held as under:-
B Company plus one platoon (ex C Coy), plus one platoon (ex A Coy) — NORTHERN FLANK OF BRIDGE
A Company less one platoon and C Company less one platoon — SOUTHERN FLANK OF BRIDGED Coy was moved back to the WESTERN FLANK of BRIDGE after capture of the FERRY at 2200 hrs, as the enemy pressure at the BRIDGE was increasing.
At about 2030 hrs the withdrawing enemy (Pak’s 93 Infantry Brigade ) consisting of 31 BALUCH and 33 PUNJAB made contact with the Battalion Defended Area in the area of BRIDGE.
The enemy Light Battery consisting of 4 X 4.2 in Mortars with 4 vehicles, plus 4 additional support vehicles, drove straight towards the BRIDGE with full headlights on, unaware that the BRIDGE was held by Indian Paratroops.
When the lead vehicle was within 100 yards of the BRIDGE fire was opened, the first shot being fired from a Russian Rocket Launcher which scored a direct hit on the lead vehicle, exploding the ammunition it contained and killing 27 out of the 43 persons of the enemy battery and destroying one of the 4.2 in mortars.
The remaining 3 X 4.2 in mortars were subsequently captured.The enemy in retaliation now launched an immediate attack in almost battalion strength which was beaten back with heavy casualties.
During the night two more determined attacks were launched, one each from the Eastern and Northern flanks. These attacks were beaten back as well. In all the enemy suffered 143 killed and 10 wounded. Two Officers, 17 OR and 10 Razakars were captured together with considerable arms, ammunition and some vehicles.
The Battalion suffered 3 OR killed and one wounded. Morale and Esprit de Corps of the defenders were at its zenith, due these early successes.On 12 Dec 71, between 0530 and 1300 hrs, the enemy launched a further two attacks with approximately 500 men of his two battalions reinforced by Razakars.
These attacks were not well coordinated and were without artillery and mortar support. Caught in the open in broad daylight the attacks were easily beaten back.
By 1300 hrs the enemy’s morale appeared to be low as very few of their patrols probed the battalion’s defences or made contact with own patrols.
Demoralised, the enemy infantry now started bye passing the BRIDGE position as well as the DZ area, where 49 Field Battery as aggressive as the para infantry, was deployed to support the BRIDGE position. Enemy withdrawal was seen to be generally towards DACCA.
The info later gleaned from enemy Prisoners of War revealed that their appreciation was that a complete Para Brigade had been dropped in the TANGAIL area.
During these attacks the enemy suffered 86 Other Ranks and 52 Razakars killed and 10 OR wounded. Eleven OR and 2 Razakars were captured.
Of the enemy casualties 56 OR were killed during night 11/12 Dec 71 by the Battalion’s Combat Team, commanded by Capt Chottu Bhardwaj, consisting of an Infantry Platoon supported by a Detachment RCL, Section MMG, Section Engineers, Det Rocket Launcher (Russian) located in area ICHAPUR Bridge to guard the Northern Flank. Own casualties were one OR killed and one JCO and 2 OR wounded.
At 0900 hrs 12 Dec 71, info was received that TANGAIL had been vacated. A fighting patrol was therefore dispatched which occupied it without incident. At 1200 hrs the Air Strike which was to go in at 0800 hrs, eventually materialized.
The strike was directed towards village ELENGA and succeeded in knocking out some enemy vehicles and causing casualties to retreating enemy troops. So far neither ‘Tiger’ Siddiqui, nor Capt Ghosh had made contact with the Battalion.
At 1700 hrs 12 Dec 1971 the leading elements of the JHANGI PALTAN (1 MLI) made contact with own troops in area BRIDGE. About the same time Tiger SIDDIQUI’s forces also made contact. The advance was resumed by 95 Mountain Brigade. Up to now the Para Battalion Group was operating directly under 101 Comn Zone Area, but at 1700 hrs 12 Dec 1971, was placed under command 95 Mountain Brigade.
The Brigade Commander was Brig Hardev Singh Kler (Sigs), a Paratrooper, a colourful personality, who was to win a MVC for these subsequent ops.On 13 Dec 71, 2 Para Battalion Group was busy in reorganising and in collection of ammunition, eqpt and stores from the DZ.
It was the Link-up that accelerated the advance of 95 Mountain Brigade towards DACCA. TANGAIL was also vacated by the enemy due to the airborne assault, enabling 95 Mountain Brigade to commence advancing towards MIRZAPUR.
On 14 Dec 1971 the Battalion was ordered to move from its defences on the BRIDGE and FERRY to TANGAIL and occupy the enemy vacated District Headquarters. At daybreak on 15 Dec 1971, the Battalion now refreshed and raring to go forward, was tasked to advance from TANGAIL on Rd TANGAIL- MIRZAPUR-JAYDEBPUR.
Around 0800 hrs the Battalion was ordered to change the axis of advance and move on axis MANIKGANJ – DACCA, initially towards MIRPUR to capture an enemy held Bridge. The Bridge action being successful, the advance on Rd MANIKGANJ-DACCA towards MIRPUR was resumed at 2200 hrs night 15/16 Dec 1971.
At about 2300 hrs the Van Guard Coy attacked an enemy delaying position of platoon strength located astride the road. The enemy withdrew after suffering casualties. The advance was resumed at 2330 hrs. After clearing a second delaying position of platoon strength, leading elements reached the MIRPUR BRIDGE.
The time was now 0200 hrs on 16 Dec 71, when the GOC 101 Communication Zone Area Maj Gen Nagra arrived by helicopter and said that a cease-fire had been declared in Bangladesh effective 0900 hrs 16 Dec 1971. General Nagra had replaced General Gurbaksh who wounded in a mine blast had been evacuated to hospital.
A message to surrender was sent to General Niazi the Pakistani Commander-in Chief by Maj Gen Nagra. The message read “Abdullah I am here. The game is up. I suggest you give yourself up and I shall look after you.”
The Battalion Adjutant Capt Nirbhay Sharma and the General’s ADC Capt Mehta eagerly volunteered to take the message to Gen Niazi. They now rode a jeep with paratroop escort to Lt Gen AAK Niazi’s HQs and handed over the message.
Despite the fully armed and belligerent East Pakistanis in and around General’s Niazi’s HQs, the two young officers protected by their escort delivered the message and returned safely to inform Gen Nagra that their task had been completed successfully. Indeed a courageous and commendable venture on their part.
The surrender having been acknowledged, around 1045 hrs 16 Dec 1971, 2 (Para) Maratha was the first to enter Dacca, the Capital of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.
Lt Col KS Pannu had proved to be an outstanding Battalion Commander. He had trained his men hard and planned and executed a brilliant operation, the first of its kind since Independence.
He had in true airborne tradition led his Battalion from the front right from the mounting airfields in West Bengal, the para drop at TANGAIL and the capture of his objectives; and finally the victorious entry into DACCA. His dash, daring and exemplary leadership in battle earned him a well deserved MAHAVIR CHAKRA.
In fact 2 Para (Maratha) and its supporting units of artillery, engineers, signals, as well as its logistic support units, performed with exemplary zeal and devotion, throughout the operation.For gallantry during operations a number of officers, JCOs, NCOs and paratroopers were decorated.
The greatest honour of all however, was when subsequently, the Battalion was awarded “Poongli Bridge 1971” as a Battle Honour and “Bangladesh” as a Theatre Honour. (extracts from Musing of a Mutt from Meerut by Lt General Mathew Thomas)